4. Reasons Against the Second Conclusion and their Solution

341. Against the second conclusion [n.329] he intimates three reasons:

The first is of this sort: the greater quantity has not been drawn out from the potency of matter, for the quantity does not have a subject; but such an entity [sc. the greater quantity] is said to be created; and so, in such a change, a greater quantity cannot come to be save by creation.

342. Second, because the body of Christ remains under the species of bread as long as the accidents remain that affected the substance of the bread; but for you the quantity is altogether new, or different from before [n.328];     therefore , the body of Christ does not remain there, which however is not the position held.

343. Third as follows: “The being of successive things consists in the succession of parts as to prior and posterior; but there cannot be prior and posterior in motion unless there is something that varies as to prior and posterior; therefore etc     .”

344. And he responds to these arguments:

To the first [n.341] as follows, that because in this change there is not thus one thing and another thing that at some point has interrupted being - neither because, namely, it is corrupted in itself or something else like it is regenerated, nor because one thing is contrary to the other; rather is it of one idea in form and species, and in existing continuously and without interruption - therefore nothing prevents the idea of motion from being capable of being posited here.

345. And this reason could be applied to the first [n.341], namely because there is on this account no creation, “because there is no production of some new being of a thing corrupted in itself, but only the production of some being as to form and species according to a certain successive ‘coming to be’ of a thing conserved” [Godfrey, ibid.]

346. He does, however, say to the first [n.341] that “just as it was in the potency of the subject that a greater quantity could, without creation, be introduced after a lesser quantity by a created agent, so does this force remain in a separated quantity, so that a greater after a lesser is brought to be by a natural agent and without creation,- such that the term ‘from which’ is the quantity lesser in degree from which the motion begins, while the term ‘to which’ is the quantity greater in some other degree at which the change stops; but motion is the flow of quantity indeterminate between these two definite terms, and possessed of existence in quasi infinite degrees between them. But if some quantity were to come to be such that it would not have a relation to the pre-existing quantity, that quantity would properly be created” [Godfrey, ibid.] - In this final word does his response seem to stand, namely that there is no creation here, because the new quantity that is introduced has such a relation to the pre-existing quantity, because it succeeds to it by an uninterrupted flow, according to quasi infinite degrees in the form of the quantity.

347. To the second [n.342] he replies that “the body of Christ does not cease to be there because of just any variation in the species, but only because of such a variation as could not exist unless, along with the change of species, the substance of the bread and wine would, were it there, also change; and therefore, as long as the species remain in uninterrupted being under such rareness or extension, and so on about other features (but provided the bread could be affected by them), so long does the body of Christ remain there.”

348. To the third [n.343] he says that in motion that is toward quantity, whether it is per se, namely in increase, or is in rarefaction (as in the issue at hand [n.337]), it is not possible to take there a per se and primary order of any parts save in quantity; and thus will the separated species be understood to have an order in coming to be and in succession, because part will be able to succeed continuously to part when not in a subject just as when in a subject.